Back to 2018 Programme

Discrimination in Hiring: Evidence from Retail Sales

Alan Benson, University of Minnesota; Simon Board, UCLA; Moritz Meyer-ter-vehn, UCLA

D2 Managers: Information, Alignment, and Flexibility
Chair: Raffaella Sadun, Harvard
Room Raymond Chabot Grant Thornton

Abstract

Using data from a major U.S. retailer, we find that black, white and Hispanic managers within the same store are 2-3% more likely to hire workers of their own race. This segregation may be caused by taste-based discrimination, whereby managers intrinsically prefer same-race applicants, or by screening discrimination, whereby managers have better information about same-race applicants. To separate between these hypotheses we use the productivity distributions of commission-based salespeople. We find workers are generally more productive when hired by a same-race manager, and that white and Hispanic workers also have lower productivity variance when hired by a same-race manager, suggesting that screening discrimination is more important than taste-based discrimination.