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Historical Path Dependence in Intergovernmental Tax Arrangements

Rose Camille Vincent, ETH Zürich; Kaj Thomsson, Maastricht University

D61 Political incentives in subnational jurisdictions

Abstract

This paper investigates the role of deep historical elements in shaping intergovernmental tax arrangements as an alternative to the various modern-day features suggested by economic theories. We connect historical elements and key explanatory factors embedded in ethno-cultural diversity and geography to new indicators measuring the taxing rights of sub-national governments in many countries. We estimate the effects of economically relevant and historical institutional variables on the current design of the multi-layer tax structure across more than 70 countries in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. The results confirm the relevance of the historical variables. Sub-national governments in countries with a higher degree of pre-colonial state centralization tend to have greater discretionary power over tax matters today. The path out of colonization also matters: countries that have experienced a violent independence movement tend to have a more centralized tax structure. Contrary to the conventional view, ethno-cultural diversity falls short in explaining multi-layer tax arrangements. However, the standard economic theories are not all irrelevant: country size and terrain ruggedness tend to imply greater decentralization of tax-related decisions. The results are robust to an extensive set of control variables and a range of IV-GMM estimations using ecological diversity, the Tsetse suitability index, and Neolithic transition timing as instrumental variables for pre-colonial centralization.